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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of strategic corporate social responsibility responses,
by drawing on the analogy of biological species-level adaptations of camouflage and
courtship found in the natural world. In so doing, we focus on the substantive
response and associated strategic motivation to engage in different types of CSR
within a mainstreaming environment; and the mechanisms by which it occurs in dif-
fering scenarios, framed through a biological interpretative lens. We presents eight
strategic approaches to CSR, each defined by a camouflage or courtship approach.
Each strategy is considered through the lens of their biological comparators and pub-
lished case vignettes of CSR strategies within firms. The paper concludes by dis-
cussing a future research agenda building on the theoretical framework presented.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Increasingly it is assumed that the largest, most visible or high pollut-
ing firms are active participants in corporate social responsibility activ-
ities (CSR; Bondy et al., 2012). This mainstreaming of CSR coincides
with an increasingly complex and fragmented environment for firms,
as demands of CSR are set both collectively and specifically through
stakeholder pressure, expectations and attribution (Agle et al., 1999;
Godfrey et al., 2009). Pressure to assume CSR into everyday practice
can result in both isomorphic conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
creating a collective rather than an individual strategic response
(e.g., by joining self-regulating industry frameworks, Nikolaevna &
Bicho, 2011), or emphasise differing priorities that are firm specific,
necessitating the adoption of different CSR strategies tailored to their
own individual context and need. It is this tension, between the wider
institutional expectations on the firm and their response to specific
stakeholder demands—particularly as firms will experience both to dif-
fering degrees simultaneously—that we explore in this paper. More-
over, whilst the extant literature has examined the business
imperative for CSR (for reviews, see Carroll and Shabana (2010); Kong
et al. (2020)), the strategic rationale for specific CSR strategies and the
adoption of CSR practices therein, remains conceptually embryonic.
To address this gap, we develop a theory of strategic responses to
CSR using the biological framing of camouflage and courtship.
In the natural world plants and animals have evolved to distract,
hide, attract, or communicate to other species through a variety of
species-level behaviours and biological adaptations. As a cluster of
activities these are either camouflage (ways to hide, defend, deflect)
or courtship (ways to attract or communicate). Typically in the biologi-
cal sciences these are discussed as a continuum, and so we do so here
in terms of CSR. A biological framing using ‘nature's functioning as
interpretative lenses to theorize about human organizations and orga-
nizational networks’ (Winn & Pogutz, 2013, p. 3) has been utilised
previously in the study of management phenomena. From Paul Hawk-
en's work on the ecology of commerce and the Natural Step, to the
seminal paper by Hannan and Freeman (1977) on organisations and
population ecology, and Amburgey and Rao's (1996) review of the
theoretical and empirical development of the organisational ecology
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field. More recent work includes the potential contributions of neuro-
science (McDonald, 2018), punctuated equilibrium in strategy dis-
course (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), sustainability discourse in the
media (Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012), ecosystems and the circular econ-
omy (Zucchella & Previtali, 2019) and nature-based metaphors in the
exploration of marketing (Mitchell & Saren, 2008).
As with all academic enquiry, there are criticisms of the application
of biological framing to the study of organisations within the literature
(see, e.g., Nafal et al., 2018; Young, 1988). Some argue that the individ-
ual agency of organisations stands in direct contrast to the relative iner-
tia of environmental determinism within species (Boone & van
Witteloostuijn, 1995). Others state that in the natural kingdom, differ-
ent species respond based on predetermined genetic, cellular or behav-
ioural patterns, whereas organisational actors are responding based on
rational choice. However, we would argue that managers make strategic
decisions that whilst informed by rationality, are also influenced by the
social and cultural contexts of the firm, industry (Saguta &
Takahashi, 2015) and physical location (Ortiz de Mandojana et al.,
2016); as well as instinct or ‘gut’ (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). The lat-
ter is particularly the case when the environment is fast moving. Thus
whilst organisations in the anthropogenic environment do have individ-
ual agency, when we view their choices over time and across a range of
firms or their ‘ecosystem’, what starts to emerge are ‘bounded’ choices
or patterns that are similar to the selection of a ‘programmed’ choice by
those in natural systems; shaped by culture, rationality but also individ-
ual and collective instinct. This suggests that exploring the common
ecosystem properties that nature and organisations both possess, has
much to offer in the study of strategic CSR at an organisational level.
Thus drawing on a biological analogy with a camouflage/courtship fram-
ing has much to offer in advancing strategic CSR theory development.
In addition, Nafal et al. (2018) through a meta-review of papers
on the biological framing management, find no organising framework,
and very limited empirical testing of conceptual frameworks proposed
therein. So, in this paper we are also not looking at the gap between
the symbolic and the substantive in CSR (Walker & Wan, 2012), CSR
as ‘greenwashing’ (Ferron-Vilchez et al., 2020), or the so-called CSR
‘trash talk’ (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Instead we focus on the sub-
stantive responsive choice and associated strategic motivation to
engage in different types of CSR within a mainstreaming environment,
and the mechanisms by which it occurs in differing scenarios framed
through a biological interpretative lens.
We therefore present an organising framework (Nafal
et al., 2018) that captures the strategic intent of what firms do, rather
than what they ought, whilst acknowledging that firms will at any one
time be engaged in a range of strategic decisions, and so each will
require specific consideration. In so doing, we ask if the intent is to
engage in a defensive, that is to say where the firm is being pushed
into a CSR strategy or action; or attractive, that is to say that the firm
is attempting to pull attention onto its strategy, be that new, or for
other purposes? Is this decision taken specifically individualised to the
firm, or related to a group/multiple identity? Who (which stakeholder)
is this CSR activity responding to? Is their CSR activity aimed at a spe-
cific group of stakeholders or responding to a crisis? We thus propose
that the primary strategic CSR choice arises as a result of a push/
defence or pull/attraction strategy. We categorise these types on two
theoretical dimensions: first whether the firm is responding to specific
stakeholder concerns or broader institutionalised pressures and
norms; and second related to the decision by a firm to respond at an
individual or group level. We add nuance to this decision by then delv-
ing into the sub-categories of this typology with our eight strategic
positions as illustrated in Figure 1. In this next section we expand on
our reasoning behind each of these architypes.
2 | COURTSHIP AND CAMOUFLAGE
Camouflage in nature can take a number of forms depending on the
surrounding physical environment, the density and diversity of habi-
tats, and the predators facing a particular species (Stevens &
Merilaita, 2011). To achieve camouflage, the scientific literature sug-
gests animals must either,
1. Move to the correct habitat at the right time of the season dis-
playing the appropriate fixed camouflage patterns.
2. Alter posture or behaviour.
3. Live with a fixed pattern that represents a compromise between
the requirements of several habitats.
4. Use adaptive colour-based camouflage for rapidly shifting external
environments (Hanlon et al., 2011).
From the same biological root, courtship can also see animals tak-
ing a strategic approach to attract attention or a mate through
1. Displays and behaviours, using colour or behaviour as a form of
communication
2. and/or signalling a specific audience for a particular reason
(Svensson et al., 2010).
Camouflage and courtship seen in the natural world therefore
offer insight into the ecosystems surrounding firms and their
individualised strategic or group level responses. We thus see parallels
in the way firms strategically seek to attract ‘mates’ (partners, cus-
tomers etc.) or defend against ‘predators’ (other firms, pressure
groups, critics, etc.). When exploring a firm's CSR activities however,
their strategies are not mutually exclusive, with some firms seen
adopting more than one approach, perhaps concurrently for different
stakeholders or issues, or at different times in their business lifecycle
or in differing institutional environments. For the purposes of this
paper however we position these strategies as either primarily a cam-
ouflage (push/defensive) or courtship (pull/attraction) strategy and
draw on the literature from the biological sciences to do so in devel-
oping their definitions and nomenclature. Our typology of strategic
approaches thus includes four camouflage approaches; shadowing,
dazzle, background matching, motion matching, and four courtship
strategies; self-decoration, signalling, associative identities, distractive
mimicry. We reflect on these in an iterative manner, considering how
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each biological phenomenon may relate to CSR practice and anteced-
ent theories within the CSR literature.
2.1 | Camouflage approaches
In our first cluster of strategies we consider camouflage within strate-
gic CSR as a mechanism by which a firm hides, deflects or obscures
attention away from negative aspects of performance or potential
negative impacts. It is a strategy whereby attention is pushed from
something, as opposed to the courtship approach of pulling attention
onto something. Specifically we present four distinct camouflage
strategies;
• Shadowing: an individual firm uses its position within the supply
chain or its public profile as an anticipatory defensive strategy to
deflect or push attention away from potential CSR failures.
• Dazzle: a named firm adopts a flagship CSR strategy, often pushed
by specific stakeholder pressure or a specific issue; but this action
does not change the overall CSR approach within the individual firm.
• Background Matching: a firm adopts the CSR standard as dictated
by its industrial sector or sub-sector. It does not pursue an individ-
ual CSR approach and thus accepts the push of the wider institu-
tional environment.
• Motion Matching: a firm responds individually to key changes in
institutional CSR expectations, pushed by key stakeholder
demands.
We expand and explore each below, with illustrative examples,
beginning with shadowing.
2.1.1 | Shadowing
Shadowing, shading and countershading (Stevens & Merilaita, 2011)
are all types of camouflage effects in nature that play with difference
in light and dark, and location of the animal at depth or to the surface
of their environment, for example, water. Extending this analogy, a
firm is located within its operating environment or ‘pool’. These
‘pools’ have complex mixtures of stakeholders and varied cultural/
political dimensions that determine acceptable corporate behaviour
(Crilly et al., 2016). The degree of shadowing undertaken is deter-
mined by the firm's over-arching approach to CSR. Perhaps they take
a ‘doing good’ or a ‘do no harm’ approach as a form of reputational
insurance (Kim, 2014; Minor & Morgan, 2011). The more ‘light’
(i.e., visibility) that there is on an individual firm in the ‘pool’, deter-
mined by relative size, position, and end user, the more they need to
manage stakeholder perceptions of their CSR activity, and thus are
more likely to adopt a ‘doing good’ stance. They may however be able
to ‘counter-shade’ pushing negative aspects of firm performance,
activity or corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) onto less visible third-
party suppliers. Moreover, firms further down the ‘pool’/supply chain,
can use the shadow cast by the larger primary supplier to deflect and
push away direct attention of stakeholders.
Perhaps the most illustrative example is the contrast between the
reaction to BP and Halliburton during the Deep-Water Horizon disas-
ter as this shows how ‘depth’ within an industry ‘pool’ can be so criti-
cal to CSR response. Prior to this disaster BP had a well published
‘doing good’ CSR strategy (Balmer et al., 2011) to counteract their
position as one of the leading oil producers in the world. Post the
Deep Water Horizon incident, BP as the firm with the higher profile,
became the primary target for those seeking redress. Yet Halliburton
were the supplier of the failed machinery that caused the explosion
and subsequent oil spill. However, as a third-tier supplier it would
seem that they were able to use the shadow cast by BP in the ‘pool’
of oil producers to avoid direct criticism and reputational harm.
Similarly and more recently, in 2013 Rana Plaza complex in
Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2013, which housed a range of garment manu-
facturers, experienced a structural collapsed causing significant loss of
life. This disaster was brought about by a lack of basic health and
safety being observed in the building. The blame was immediately
pushed onto the 28 first tier international retailers who sourced the
garments being manufactured in the building, rather than the garment
manufacturers themselves. Focus was on the lack of regard by these
first-tier suppliers for the manufacturing conditions, rather than on
the second and third tier suppliers occupying the building, that led
those at the ‘top’ of the ‘pool’ being viewed as irresponsible
(Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2018). This incident once again turned
the spotlight on the poor working conditions tolerated by both gar-
ment retailers and consumers in the developed world. The arising
F IGURE 1 Summary of CSR typology
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Accord on Health and Safety in Bangladeshi factories (Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson, 2018) with a commitment to change their practices
and to audit their supply chains to ensure that working conditions
were safe, was subsequently signed by nearly 200 international gar-
ment retailers. To date, very little, if any critique has been directed at
the garment manufacturers themselves.
Thus shadow strategies are used most effectively by those who
swim in deeper waters, lower down the supply chain, or supply firms
with higher profiles. Deep in the pool a firm can avoid the complexi-
ties of high CSR expectations. This is risky however, as while the com-
pany that faces the end consumer may be exposed for failures in its
supply chain (like BP above), firms deeper in the pool may still ulti-
mately feel the repercussions of this strategic choice.
2.1.2 | Dazzle
In the animal kingdom motion dazzle is a form of obscure camouflage
where markings on the animal or object make estimating speed and tra-
jectory difficult to interpret by the receiver and so are used as an anti-
predator defence (Stevens et al., 2011). Dazzle camouflage has also
been used in military applications to make ships and airplanes difficult
to track; thus pushing away or diverting enemy fire (Behrer, 1987).
In our CSR typology, dazzle strategies are undertaken response to
being caught in some form of corporate indiscretion or in response to
an overt threat targeted at an individual firm by salient stakeholders
(Mitchell et al., 1997). As such the firm is pushed into a CSR strategy
that it might not otherwise have adopted. A move to an individual
dazzle strategy from a collective group approach may be due to an
unexpected crisis event. A good example is the attack on the choco-
late industry by Greenpeace (Brant, 2018) and the exposure of spe-
cific firms therein.
In March 2010 Greenpeace launched a report and video exposing
the link between chocolate, palm oil, illegal deforestation and the kill-
ing of orangutans in Malaysia (Greenpeace, 2010). This video explicitly
used an image of a Nestle Kit Kat as their centre piece; with a bloody
orangutan finger in place of the famous Kit Kat chocolate ‘finger’. The
publicity from the YouTube video which received more than a million
views, promoted in part by Nestle's attempts to have it removed, and
various activist events at shareholder meetings, led Nestlé to hire a
consulting firm to audit its suppliers for illegal activity.(Wolf, 2014). In
response, Nestle joined the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil,
removed the palm-oil supplier Sinar Mas criticised in the report from
their supply chain, partnered with the Forest Trust and committed to
sustainable sourced palm oil by 2015.
Thus firms engaged in dazzle as part of their immediate defensive
response to a ‘crisis’ event (Kotchen & Moon, 2012) will emphasise to
salient stakeholders their positive CSR changes and thus seek forgive-
ness. Also, the damage caused by a CSI incident may vary depending
on the firm's prior reputational insurance (Godfrey et al., 2009;
Minor & Morgan, 2011) and how willing salient stakeholders are to
forgive these indiscretions (Crilly et al., 2016; Mitchell et al., 1997).
The likelihood of forgiveness will in turn relate to attribution theory
(where an observed behaviour is determined as deliberate and attrib-
utable to an internal or external cause) and the firm's historical record
in a specific community (Martinko, 2004). A firm responding with a
dazzle strategy to a crisis event that was an out of character mistake,
rather than a systemic moral failure of an organisation, may thus be
able to weather a negative publicity storm by a rapid dazzle response.
Similarly, dispositional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) is also ascribed to
those firms who are perceived by stakeholders to have ‘good’ charac-
ter, and thus are more likely to be forgiven for negative incidences
(Crilly et al., 2016). We may see firms develop such dispositional legiti-
macy through their courtship efforts (via signalling or high-profile self-
decoration activities; see later in this paper) that build a positive
image. However, firms known for irresponsibility will have less lati-
tude (and less dispositional legitimacy) and are thus more likely to be
‘punished’ for CSI than rewarded for CSR (Lange & Washburn, 2012).
Thus, Dazzle will work for those firms with a positive or neutral
CSR reputation. Adopting the suggestions of a key stakeholder,
and/or being pushed into responding swiftly to exposure of CSR
failure(s), can be an effective strategy when attempting to manage a
CSR crisis. However for those in the ‘sinful’ industries or with a signif-
icant negative CSR legacy and thus less dispositional legitimacy, a
Dazzle strategy will be less effective, and so more likely to be met
with scepticism from key stakeholders. Such firms will need to use a
courtship CSR strategy such as distractive mimicry (discussed below).
2.1.3 | Background matching
Crypsis or background matching occurs in nature when an animal pre-
vents detection by adapting or matching their physical appearance to
their environment. This can be done through colour, lightness and/or
pattern. When we apply this idea of background matching we look to
firms adopting CSR camouflage strategies that are externally driven
by the sector in which a firm is located or shaped by their broader
institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Where a domi-
nant CSR logic exists, this will push isomorphic conformity into the
strategic approach taken by firms within a particular institutional
space. As a result, specific codes of practice or industry norms emerge
as a way of managing perceptions by others of a firm. In such circum-
stances, firms will use CSR activity to blend in and harmonise. They
receive a push from stakeholders at a group or collective level rather
than one on one; examples might include the accreditation to an envi-
ronmental management standard (Wahba, 2010), such as ISO14001.
It might also include joining special interest groups around key topics
such as climate change, sustainable sourcing and/or modern slavery.
Implicit or incremental CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008) suggests that
the adoption of CSR strategy is not a conscious strategic decision;
rather it is a reaction to, or a reflection of, a firm's institutional envi-
ronment. Thus, we argue that implicit CSR is a form of background
matching whereby the codified rules and norms within a firms' imme-
diate environment shape their CSR activities, or a form of mirrored
co-operative behaviours (after Axelrod, 1984). This leads to confor-
mity or mimicry of one another's strategic CSR approach (DiMaggio &
4 CROTTY AND HOLT
Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), rather than seeking to use it for
competitive advantage (Vilanova et al., 2009). Hosoda and
Suzuki (2015), for example, explore the increasing use of management
control systems across large Japanese firms to respond to these isomor-
phic pressures. Similarly, more than 200 global companies have also
joined the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. For
leading global firms' exclusion from such networks might suggest to exter-
nal audiences that they are lagging behind their peers in terms of their
social and environmental responsibilities. Joining social interest groups
and baseline standards are unlikely to be used for competitive advantage,
and more likely used to illustrate conformity with peers and a sector.
Industry-based studies also show the extent to which background
matching can pump isomorphism into a firm's individual approach to
CSR. O'Connor and Gronewald (2012), for example, concluded from a
study of 21 Fortune 500 oil and gas firms that standardised reporting
practices and formats made some sections of each firm's CSR commu-
nication indistinguishable from one another. This created what they
termed ‘homogenised CSR’ (O'Connor & Gronewald, 2012, p. 229)
used more for defence than for distinction.
Thus a background matching strategy will be adopted where the
industrial context sets out clear expectations or push factors with
regards individual firms CSR behaviours and actions. This limits the
risk of being targeted by individual stakeholders (unless a firm
diverges from these) on the individual firm's CSR record. If those
expectations change, then each firm has an incentive to work collec-
tively to respond to those changes, as per the response to the electri-
fication of motor vehicles illustrated above.
2.1.4 | Motion matching
In the animal kingdom motion camouflage involves obscuring move-
ment to decrease the likelihood of being detected; ‘tricking’ a receiver
into seeing no movement. Here objects in motion move at the same
speed or angle so both appear stationary to each other and thus push
attention away. In adopting this analogy, we see a type of CSR cam-
ouflage approach driven by changes in the external environment
related specifically to their primary stakeholder concerns, rather than
general non-specific pressure, or to an overall shift in ‘background’
such as the change in the content of a specific standard.
Perhaps the best example of motion matching is the switch to
electric cars by all of the major motor manufacturers. Previously
viewed as a niche market (Tesla), or something where firms could dem-
onstrate technical prowess rather than practicality; the prevailing insti-
tutional environment has signalled strongly that petrol and diesel cars
will be phased or legislated out of existence by 2050. As a result, all
major motor manufacturers are now investing heavily in repurposing
their plants for electric car manufacture. Moreover, rather than using
this as an opportunity for green first mover advantage (Przychodzen
et al., 2020), this fundamental shift for the industry has led to strategic
alliances, for example, Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi, as they adjust to
this fundamental shift in stakeholder demand and consumer expecta-
tion (Riley, 2019). No manufacturer can be left behind, and so all must
adjust and work towards this new baseline CSR demand of the regula-
tor. As we see here, firms choose to coalesce in formalised groups;
gaining the benefits of the collective, but sacrificing the potential com-
petitive advantage that could come from a more individual approach.
Signing up to new iterations of the global reporting index (GRI)
such as the 2019 Tax Standards and the 2020 waste Standards might
also be considered an example of a motion matching strategy. Each
iteration of the GRI has an incremental shift in sustainability reporting
expectations so firms that are accredited to GRI (with 93% of the
words largest 250 firms now part of the GRI initiative, GRI, 2016),
must motion match to keep pace with the other firms in this club.
Though recent studies have cast doubt on the impact of the CSR out-
comes arising from the GRI, it remains a baseline for its signatories
and thus a way to ensure that a firm meets minimum CSR expecta-
tions (Talbot & Barbat, 2020) ‘keeping up’ is the only requirement.
Motion matching does not need to come from an incremental
industry standard or through legislative changes; the recent behaviour
of UK supermarkets in the wake of rising consumer awareness of food
waste being a good example. Coinciding with the austerity measures
put in place by the UK government after the 2008 financial crisis, many
in the UK experienced food poverty. In response, Tesco, one of the
UK's leading supermarkets a adopted a ‘signalling’ strategy (see below),
and engaged in a direct partnership with The Trussell Trust, one of the
leading UK charities running foodbanks, to donate all edible food not
sold to their banks. As awareness of food waste grew, Tesco's nearest
rivals joined them in making donations either to The Trussell Trust of
Fareshare; another charity that redistributes usable, unsold food. Thus
we saw this sub-group engage in a motion-matching approach, mirroring
each other's behaviour. Since 2008, new entrant discount retailers such
as the German firms Aldi and Lidl have gained a significant share of the
UK supermarket. They too have recognised the need to ‘keep up’ and
have been ‘pushed’ into adopted schemes that are similar to their most
established rivals; starting partnerships with local food banks, and donat-
ing meals to specific charities at Christmas (see Hird, 2019). This
approach of course does not deal with the cause of the food waste—it
only provides a solution to waste once it has arisen. This would require
a more direct or disruptive CSR strategy led by a front runner as with
the signalling example earlier, or if in response to highly negative
targeted pressure might be the resultant dazzle strategy.
This distinction between background and motion matching is a
subtle but important one. Both are group strategies. Background ones
are general approaches to non-specific pressures, prompted by the
general environment without a specific direct imperative. Motion
matching strategies are a group response that moves to a ‘new’ nor-
mal related to specific stakeholder concerns. There is the possibility
that such motion becomes institutionalised and thus reverts to a back-
ground matching strategy in the future.
Thus, firms will adopt a motion matching strategy as external pres-
sure from salient stakeholders to improve industry-wide CSR activity
increases, or the norms of expected CSR activity change significantly
for the whole industry. Thus firms within that industry will tend to
adopt similar approaches, such as the food bank example above—rather
than seek individual solutions. A firm will therefore adopt a motion
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matching strategy where expectations in the external environment push
a specific group level change. In cases such as the supermarkets and
foodbanks, or electric cars above, if a similar approach is adopted by all
firms in the sector or sub-sector, these changes are likely to become
the standard, and thus revert to background matching.
All of the camouflage strategies above obscure the real extent, or
lack of, CSR activity within a firm (Shadowing), or are responsive to the
demands of key stakeholders. The ‘push’ aspect of these strategies also
indicates that they are predominantly reactive. Stakeholders might tar-
get an individual firm (Dazzle), or an industry (Motion Matching), or the
CSR expectations of an industry may be institutionalised by that indus-
try (Background Matching), making it easier for individual firms to know
how to engage. Camouflage strategies are thus mechanism(s) by which
firms hide, deflect or obscure attention away from negative aspects of
performance or potential negative impacts. They can also be a way to
engage with the minimum CSR expectation, or facilitate an overt policy
of not seeking competitive advantage through CSR. These are distinct
from the courtship approach, which seeks to pulling attention onto
something. We explore these below.
2.2 | Courtship approaches
In the four courtship strategies we see a strategy linked to attraction
often ‘pulling’ attention onto the firm, or to specific aspects of the
firm's activities over less attractive aspects of their operations or per-
formance. Like camouflage above we present four distinct strategic
approaches.
• Self-decoration: a firm will engage in a specific CSR action, usually
prompted by an opportunity in the external environment, but this
action will not alter the overall CSR approach taken by the firm. A
firm will seek to pull attention towards this individual activity for
short-term gain.
• Signalling: a firm in seeking out CSR alliances and partnerships, will
overtly champion its relevant competences, performance and
values hoping to pull others into its agenda.
• Associative Identities: a deliberate attempt to refocus attention by
acquiring a firm that has higher CSR credentials than itself. It is hoped
that by pulling this firm into its orbit, that the overall level of CSR
activity and positive perception by outsiders will increase.
• Distractive Mimicry: adopted by firms in so-called ‘sinful industries’
to pull attention away from the inherent badness of their core busi-
ness. Such CSR activity will not be related to that core business.
We explore each in turn, with illustrative examples, below.
2.2.1 | Self-decoration
As part of their courtship ritual, some animals decorate themselves
with items from their local environment, or present shiny objects to
signal attraction to a mate (Fiegl, 2013); the decorator crab being the
most obvious example (Hultgren & Stachowicz, 2011). With respect
to firms, we suggest that self-decoration is used for courtship;
adorning the corporate ‘shell’ to appeal to a salient stakeholder group
(Kolk & Perego, 2014; Mitchell et al., 1997), rather than to camouflage
CSR activity. This can be characterised by ‘punctuated generosity’
(after Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013) and/or ‘vanity’ projects (after Cushen &
Thompson, 2012). Self-decoration strategies might also be used to
generate symbolic CSR (Perez-Batres et al., 2012), critiqued by some
as ‘greenwashing’ (Walker & Wan, 2012).
Self-decoration is an individualised response, internally con-
structed, shaped by some aspect of the local environment (which var-
ies depending on the size and geographical spread of the
organisation), and more likely (though not always) to be ad hoc, taking
advantage of an opportunity in that operating environment and con-
textualised to local needs. Self-decoration strategies are also unlikely
to be transformative, as they will involve items or actions being placed
on the ‘shell’ of the organisation, without fundamentally changing the
underlying structure, culture and management of the firm. Thus they
will likely pull attention towards a specific action, without altering
core CSR activity; though this initial gateway may result in more fun-
damental CSR activities later. Such self-decoration initiatives might
distinguish organisations from their competitors, and can be unrelated
to the primary business; decoupling CSR strategy from overall firm
strategy, presenting a shiny object (Fiegl, 2013) to court the attention
of specific stakeholder groups.
A good example is the Xerox community involvement programme.
Here their focus is on a ‘glocal’ approach funding employees in their local
communities to make a difference on projects of their choosing. In 2019
they supported 25,000 h of volunteer time (Xerox, 2020) with their
Global Volunteer Policy. This granted every Xerox employee one workday
of paid time off to volunteer at a non-profit of their choice. In addition
their grassroots Community Involvement Program (XCIP) which began in
1974, saw Xerox invest $374,365 in XCIP with employees leading more
than 186 projects worldwide in 2019. Conversely, at the Bank of America
they took a more short-term approach, inviting female golfers to their
sponsored tournaments against the backdrop of the exclusion of female
players at the Masters in Augusta. This did nothing to impact their
approach to female progression within its own organisation (Lougee &
Wallace, 2008) or their management structure with respect to gender
(see also Brown et al., 2012), but it did raise their profile via a key issue.
Thus, self-decoration is a de-coupled emergent CSR activity that
will not result in a substantive change to a firm's existing CSR strat-
egy. It takes place when the external CSR environment presents
opportunities for self-adornment to communicate positive attributes
to the wider institutional environment, and thus pull attention onto a
specific CSR action or activity without fundamentally changing its
core CSR strategy.
2.2.2 | Signalling
In nature, the use of colour, behaviour or smell by animals can signal
their willingness to mate, is used to provoke engagements to secure
6 CROTTY AND HOLT
dominance, or to warn off predators (Stuart-Fox & Moussalli, 2011).
We define this type of CSR strategy as courtship of potential partners
for strategic alliances (Das & Teng, 1998) or actively signalling to
salient stakeholders a firm's competencies, performance and/or values
(Connelly et al., 2011). Thus the firm overtly attempts to pull external
entities towards its CSR activity.
Xu et al. (2018) explore the use of CSR activities to signal positive
firm performance in China as a mechanism to facilitate international
expansion to gain competitive advantage. Thus, with respect to CSR,
firms must choose which positive aspects to communicate about the
firm to important stakeholder groups, without attracting predators
and thus opening the firm up to wider scrutiny.
Unlike self-decoration, activities undertaken by firms engaged in
signalling, will be related to their core business. We often see social
enterprises and B Corporations engaging in such signalling activities.
A good example is the significant investment by outdoor clothing
company Patagonia in CSR, including their Footprint Chronicles and
active programmes to improve worker conditions. Their recent 2018
‘Blue Heart of Europe’ campaign also signalled their commitment to
preserving rivers in Eastern Europe, and positions them in an activist
role and reinforced their brand image linked to wilderness and adven-
ture (Rogers, 2018), thus pulling pertinent customers towards it by
stressing their proactive response to the issues that are of particular
concerns to the outdoor enthusiast. This is their individualised
response aimed at a specific salient stakeholder, as per the mapping in
Figure 1.
Firms can also use signalling to communicate an individual specific
CSR competence (Barney, 2001), for competitive advantage (Vilanova
et al., 2009). An example of this is the development of the Prius vehi-
cle and associated hybrid technologies by Toyota. In addition, to sig-
nalling the positive environmental credentials of this firm, it also
providing a halo effect over the rest of their products even when
hybrid technologies had not been used in these other products (Sex-
ton & Sexton, 2014). Thus, signalling CSR will be undertaken by firms
where there is value in a pre-emptive approach to communicating
some aspect of a firm's responsibility to their most salient
stakeholders.
2.2.3 | Associative identities
In nature, masquerade camouflage effects are used to prevent recogni-
tion by predators; with animals often resembling an uninteresting or
inanimate object. In aggressive mimicry a harmful predator can appear
less dangerous by resembling other species; the most transformative
shift in identity being that of the caterpillar metamorphosing into a
butterfly. We combine these in our CSR theory into what we call the
courtship strategy of associative identities whereby attention is pulled
towards an alternative identity.
An acquisition of CSR competence (Barney, 2001) might allow the
presentation of multiple, associated identities to pull attention in a specific
direction and court specific audiences. This strategy may also facilitate the
extrapolation of CSR competence; ideally, leading to metamorphic
transformation whereby the positive CSR attributes are not only extrapo-
lated but also fully embedded in the whole (new) extended organisation.
This argument was made to counter criticism of the purchase of Body
Shop by L'Oreal in 2006 and Ben & Jerry's by Unilever in 2000. In both
instances these firms were acquired by a larger conglomerate not known
for specific environmental competencies. They were acquired as wholly
owned subsidiaries that maintained their brand and a ‘separate’ identity;
indeed many customers were potentially unaware they were no longer
independent. Both the Body Shop were also values-based family firms
who had made conscious decisions to use CSR as the basis of their com-
petitive advantage (Vilanova et al., 2009). By acquiring these firms, L'Oréal
and Unilever assumed this CSR competence. While there may be associ-
ated synergistic benefits arising from these acquisitions, it also allowed the
larger firms to show multiple faces, to court different audiences as and
when required (Devinney, 2009). As a result, this strategic approach looks
attractive, but do associative identity strategies work?
Mirvis (2008) has explored the notion of whether CSR competen-
cies can be bought by a third party, by considering the acquisition of
the socially responsible chocolate company, Green & Blacks, by
Cadbury. Now owned by Mondelez International who purchased
Cadburys in 2017, they quietly recently launched their first chocolate
product without a fair-trade or organic certification; instead they
‘accredit’ to Mondelez's in-house standard, indicating that the Green &
Blacks ethos is now being downplayed (BBC, 2018). The former owner
of Green & Blacks had seen synergies with Cadbury's as a firm that had
been built on Quaker values, but had been behind the curve on Fair
Trade, but following the sale to sale to Mondelez, felt that its ethos
would be lost, (Milmo, 2011). It seems he has been proved right. Simi-
larly, L'Oreal, predominantly a brand specialist, could not realise the
potential synergies or transfer of competences that it might have
expected from its acquisition of The Body Shop. Instead, The Body
Shop went into decline (Hope, 2017). As a result, it sold the company
to Brazilian firm Natura in 2018. Natura's ethos and approach is more
attuned to that of The Body Shop's original mission of using natural
ingredients and rejecting animal testing and so the synergistic benefits
are likely easier to realise. Perhaps conversely, a recent interview with
Ben & Jerry's CEO Jostein Solheim suggests the values-based approach
of Ben & Jerry's has been maintained even whilst part of Unilever
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2016). What is less clear is whether there has
been any reciprocal impact upon Unilever. As these products
mainstreamed into supermarkets in the UK and elsewhere, there is little
explicit marketing of their social and environmental credentials to the
supermarket customer; rather they efforts are focused on them as a
luxury food item. These examples indicate that associative identity
strategies might show promise, with the more ethical pulling the less
ethical up, but that the reality is likely to be more difficult to achieve
and may not deliver the benefits to the parent company had hoped.
2.2.4 | Distractive mimicry
In nature disruptive colouration consists of markings that create false
edges obscuring recognition of an animal's true shape (Barbosa
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et al., 2008). Distractive markings are also associated with this type of
camouflage. Such markings draw or distract the attention of the
receiver elsewhere. One of the earliest forms of camouflage identified
by naturalist Henry Bates, a contemporary of Darwin, was protection
through Batesian Mimicry where an animal, that is typically benign or
harmless, looks like another species that is dangerous or toxic. Here
we thus combine these three natural world phenomena—disruptive
coloration, distractive markings and Batesian mimicry—to form distrac-
tive mimicry.
This is undertaken by those in ‘sinful’ industries as a proactive
CSR strategy of courtship activities, pulling attention towards a sec-
ondary identity. This identity is diversified from the core business of
the firm and is one that focusses attention elsewhere to a less harmful
or value-adding part of the business portfolio. This CSR activity pulls
attention away from, or offsets, the inherent ‘nastiness’ of their
enterprise such as selling tobacco or uranium mining; softening the
edges of such industries.
While not hiding the inherent nature of their core business, these
positive ‘contributions’ by these firms might offset some criticism. It
may be used by a firm to court salient stakeholders to buffer and/or
moderate potential critique; it may also distract negative attention
away from them to others in their peer group. This CSR strategy thus
is distinct from self-decoration in that it is more prescriptive than ad
hoc adornments. It also differs from signalling in that it is primarily a
form of reverse Batesian mimicry (a ‘harmful’ business looking more
benign) and relying on the offsetting value of their other more positive
CSR attributes pulling attention onto these more positive activities to
compensate for their sinful core business.
A good example might be the recent adoption of carbon offset-
ting by budget airlines such as the UK-based Easyjet. The budget air-
line revolution in the early 2000s made air travel accessible to
millions. However, the consequences vis-à-vis carbon emissions and
climate change have been significant, with the pace of emissions
vastly exceeding predictions (Tabuchi, 2019). To mitigate this Easyjet
and other low cost/budget airlines, have adopted carbon off-setting
programmes, where passengers can offset the carbon from their flight
investing in tree planting schemes. Yet, following recent studies by
the EU, they have decided that from 2021, carbon offsetting will not
count towards emissions reduction targets (EU, 2017). This is because
it does not work. A tree takes up to 15 years to reach peak carbon
absorption capacity, and only 1% of customers actually take it up
(EU, 2017). Friends of the Earth have referred to this practice as a
‘dangerous distraction’—yet it gives airlines a way to say that they are
seeking to mitigate their environmental impact, even if that mitigation
is limited at best.
Though many will remain suspicious about the motives for such
CSR initiatives (Palazzo & Richter, 2005) sinful industries do not have
the scope to fundamentally change their core business. Thus, any CSR
or philanthropic activity they engage in will always be viewed as an
‘add on’. Thus, while distractive mimicry may indeed generate prag-
matic legitimacy through the communication of the positive benefits
that they are generating for various influential primary stakeholders,
as sinful industries they will always be open to attack vis-à-vis their
CSR practice and core business from a range of stakeholders.
These four courtship strategies are linked to attraction, ‘pulling’
attention onto the firm, or to specific positive aspects of the firm's
activities. Just as in nature, Self-decoration uses shiny objects to
deflect or obscure the true nature of a firms CSR approach with a sin-
gle act (re female golfers at a tournament sponsored by a bank with
no explicit policy on gender equality). Signalling works by inflating the
parts of a firm's CSR performance that it thinks will be attractive,
whilst distractive mimicry uses specific non-core CSR activities to
‘soften’ the impact of the core business. Perhaps the most difficult of
the four, is associative identities. Many firms have attempted to ‘buy’
CSR by courting a more ‘ethical firm’, but few have found ways to
make it a success. Rather than positively impacting the CSR of the
acquirer, it seems that the CSR of the acquiree is compromised. We
explore the implication of these four approaches, the camouflage
strategies, and a potential future research agenda, below.
3 | CONCLUSION
We have utilised the biological framing of camouflage (as a defensive/
push) and courtship (attraction/pull strategy), to explore CSR strategic
decision making. The arising typology of strategic CSR responses are
summarised in Table 1.
In describing the specific CSR strategies emerging across these
dimensions we are informed by the characteristics of different individ-
ual camouflage and courtship types seen in nature, and illustrate these
using our case examples. In developing this organising framework
(Nafal et al., 2018) of strategic CSR activities in firms, we offer both a
theoretical contribution to the strategic CSR literature and a contribu-
tion to CSR practice. Our theoretical contribution is modelled in
Figure 1 as presented earlier.
This contribution moves beyond the extant framing of strategic
CSR to unpack what CSR is in practice when used with deliberation
and strategic intent. Our theory adds a predictive element to current
understandings of strategic CSR to elaborate on the expected CSR
strategic moves we would expect to see in large/visible corporations
in the developed world. We do believe that our theory also has reso-
nance with firms who exist in institutional environments that are less
developed but this is an area that should be tested further when con-
sidering extended boundary conditions.
An additional contribution is also demonstrated by the application
of concepts found in nature and supports the assertion that biological
framing within management theory still does have a place. In our the-
ory using the analogies of courtship and camouflage give a much-
needed lens to the complex path that firms need to negotiate in a
mainstreamed CSR environment. It allows us to bring structure and
understanding to what might appear to be disparate choices by firms
in similar circumstances. It also allows us to capture the myriad of
influences on CSR strategic decision making, specifically cultural and
social context, instinct, as well as rational choice.
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Thus, in presenting our typology of firm CSR strategies, we now
call on other researchers to explore how firms negotiate these strate-
gic choices. How do managers negotiate this myriad of influences on
CSR decision making? What drives a firm to be a motion matcher or
self-decorate? Why do firms decide to acquire an associative identity?
How do firms using two or more strategic responses simultaneously
manage this approach? How do firms using different strategic
responses interact and compete?
Our contributions may also facilitate an alternative way to explore
the difference between symbolic and substantive CSR (see,
e.g., Schons & Steinmar, 2016) to allow the exploration of those that
substantively change the CSR approach within a firm, that is, signal-
ling, and those which do not, that is, ‘self-decoration’. The extent to
which the typology is applicable to firms from developing nations
could also be explored. We therefore hope future researchers will
explore these questions further, as well as test the boundary condi-
tions of our theory and mapping of CSR strategy types in other
contexts.
Finally, in presenting this typology, we are also asserting that by
examining what CSR strategy is, rather than what is ‘should be’, we
find that firms have between a push (camouflage) or pull (courtship),
tensions that drive CSR strategy and so most firms will be engaged in
a range of strategic responses at any one time. For example, motion
matchers may be targeted by a specific salient stakeholder and so
may need to adopt a dazzle strategy (or other) in response. Self-
decoration opportunities are more likely to emerge from the prevailing
operating environment, and thus can present opportunities for spe-
cific firms who had previously been content to shadow or motion
match. Thus an exploration of the simultaneous use of our proposed
strategies within the longitudinal history of a firm's CSR activity would
also be a fruitful avenue for future research to build on this theoretical
contribution. We finally also call on other researchers to visit other
biological comparators to shed light on other areas of complexity and
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